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PARTNERSHIP ALLOCATIONS: FLIPPING THROUGH THE
SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC EFFECT HOOPS
FRANK RAINER
Partnership allocations of profits and losses are determined by
the partnership agreement or, in the absence of a provision in the
agreement, by the partners' interest in the partnership.1 One type
of allocation provision that is commonly made in partnership
agreements is the "flip." A flip is a shift in the allocation of profits
and losses upon the happening of a specified event.' An example is
the case of a limited partnership which has heavy cash contribu-
tions from the limited partners and which allocates to the limited
partners all of the net cash flow and losses until they have recov-
ered their investment. Once the limited partners have recovered
their investment, the allocation of net cash flow and losses is flip-
ped to allow the general partners to share in the partnership allo-
cations. The partners do not, however, have unlimited discretion in
determining the nature of the flip. The allocations must meet the
substantial economic effect requirement of Internal Revenue Code
Section 704(b)(2) or they will be struck down and the profits and
losses will be reallocated according to the partners' interests in the
partnership.8
I. SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIc EFFECT - CAPITAL AccouNT ANALYSIS.
Substantial economic effect is not a new concept. It has been a
part of partnership tax law since 1954,' but did not emerge as the
1. See I.R.C. § 704 (CCH 1982). Section 704, dealing with the determination of a part-
ner's distributive share, provides in relevant part:
(a) Effect of partnership agreement.-A partner's distributive share of income,
gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall, except as otherwise provided in this chapter,
be determined by the partnership agreement.
(b) Determination of distributive share.-A partner's distributive share of in-
come, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof) shall be determined in ac-
cordance with the partner's interest in the partnership (determined by taking into
account all facts and circumstances), if-
(1) the partnership agreement does not provide as to the partner's dis-
tributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof),
or
(2) the allocation to a partner under the agreement of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit (or item thereof) does not have substantial economic
effect.
2. See 1 A. WIurS, J. PNNELL & P. POSTLEWArra, PARTNERSHEP TAXATION § 46.01, at 467
1 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as WLLs.
3. See I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (CCH 1982).
4. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sesa., § 704, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
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principal test for allocations until the Tax Reform Act of 1976. e
Prior to the Reform Act, the test for determining the substantial
economic effect of allocations was whether the allocation's purpose
was the "avoidance or evasion of any tax."' While the change to
the substantial economic effect test may seem to have been a radi-
cal change, actually it was not that dramatic.7 The test had its ori-
gins in Treasury Regulation section 1.704-1(b)(2), which was
promulgated prior to the Reform Act.6 The regulation defines sub-
stantial economic effect as "whether the allocation may actually
affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares of the total part-
nership income or loss independently of tax consequences.' The
Senate Finance Committee Report submitted prior to the Reform
Act adopted the test as defined in the regulation.10 Also, as is dis-
cussed below, the courts were already using the substantial eco-
nomic effect test in determining whether an allocation involved the
"avoidance or evasion of any tax.""
It is generally believed that the way to determine whether the
allocation "actually affects" the partners' shares of income or loss
is by a capital account analysis." A definition of the capital ac-
An. Nuws 4621, 5021.
5. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as the Reform Act].
6. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1970) amended by I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (CCH 1982). Prior to 1976,
allocations were defined as either special or bottom-line. Bottom-line allocations were not
considered subject to the substantial economic effect test. See infra notes 64-69 and accom-
panying text. With the passage of the Reform Act, however, the substantial economic effect
test was made applicable to both special and bottom-line allocations. See S. RE. No. 938,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 99, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3535-36; see
also McKee, Partnership Allocations: The Need for an Entity Approach, 32 MAJOR TAX
PLAN. 1 401.1, at 4-5 (1980).
7. See Allison v. United States, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9241 (Ct. App. Fed. Cir.
1983). The court states "that this change in language [by the Reform Act] had minor sub-
stantive effect, at best, on the evaluation given special allocations by the courts which even
before 1976 emphasized the existence of substantial economic effect over other factors." Id.
at 86,567.
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964).
9. Id.
10. See S. Rim. No. 938, supra note 6, at 100.
11. See infra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
12. See Solomon, Current Planning for Partnership Startup, Including Special Alloca-
tions, Retroactive Allocations and Guaranteed Payments, 37 INST. ON FED. TAX'N §
13.03[4], at 13-11 (1979); but cf. Krane & Sheffield, Beyond Orrisch. An Alternative View of
Substantial Economic Effect Under Section 704(b)(2) Where Nonrecourse Debt Is In-
volved, 60 TAxs 937, 947 (1982) (suggesting that when nonrecourse debt is involved a per-
centage ownership analysis should be used instead of a capital account analysis); Weidner,
Partnership Allocations and Tax Reform, 5 FLA. ST. L. Rv. 1, 17 (1977) (notes that other
factors are cited in the regulation as determinative of the validity of an allocation).
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count analysis was included in the Joint Committee's explanation
of the Reform Act, and provides that:
The determination of whether an allocation may actually affect
the dollar amount of the partners' shares of total partnership in-
come or loss, independent of tax consequences, will to a substan-
tial extent involve an examination of how these allocations are
treated in the partners' capital accounts for financial (as opposed
to tax) accounting purposes; this assumes that these accounts ac-
tually reflect the dollar amounts that the partners would have the
rights to receive upon the liquidation of the partnership.1 '
Therefore, the essence of the substantial economic effect-capital
account analysis is (1) whether the allocation is used to adjust the
capital account of the partners, and (2) whether the partnership
distributions upon liquidation would be in accordance with the
partners' capital accounts."'
The landmark case in applying the capital account analysis to
determine substantial economic effect is Orrisch v. Commis-
sioner.5 Partners Orrisch and Crisafi had agreed in their partner-
ship agreement to share equally in the profits and losses from two
apartment houses. In a subsequent year, they orally agreed to
amend the partnership agreement to allocate all of the deprecia-
tion deductions to Orrisch. Also, the partners agreed that on the
sale of the property the gain would be allocated to Orrisch until he
had recouped the amount of depreciation previously charged to
him with any additional gain to be divided equally.11 The Tax
Court, in striking down the special allocation, stated the following:
To find any economic effect of the special allocation agreement
aside from its tax consequences, we must, therefore, look to see
who is to bear the economic burden of the depreciation if the
buildings should be sold for a sum less than their original cost.
There is not one syllable of evidence bearing directly on this cru-
The definition of a capital account is: The partner's capital contributions plus the part-
ner's share of partnership income minus (the partner's share of losses plus distributions
made to that partner). See Stephenson, Oil and Gas Operations Inside and Outside the
Partnership, 40 INST. ON FaD. TAX'N § 13.03(2)(c), at 13-46 to -47 (1982).
13. STAFF Or JOINT COMM. ON TAXAtON, 94TH CONG., 2D Sss., GaNiaR.E&PLANATION OF
TAX RzFORM Acr oF 1976, at 95 n.6 (1976), reprinted in 2 WI.LLS, supra note 2, § 86.03, at
86-3.
14. See McKee, supra note 6, 1 401.2, at 4-6 to -7.
15. 55 T.C. 395 (1970), affd per curiam, 31 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 1 73-556 (9th Cir. 1973).
16. Orrisch, 55 T.C. at 397.
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cial point. We have noted, however, that when the buildings are
fully depreciated, petitioners' capital account will have a deficit,
or there will be a disparity in the capital accounts, approximately
equal to the undepreciated basis of the buildings as of the begin-
ning of 1966. Under normal accounting procedures, if the building
were sold at a gain less than the amount of such disparity peti-
tioners would either be required to contribute to the partnership
a sum equal to the remaining deficit in their capital account after
the gain on the sale had been added back or would be entitled to
receive a proportionately smaller share of the partnership assets
on liquidation. Based on the record as a whole, we do not think
the partners ever agreed to such an arrangement. On dissolution,
we think the partners contemplated an equal division of the part-
nership assets. . . .That being true, the special allocation does
not "actually affect the dollar amount of the partners' share of
the total partnership income or loss independently of tax conse-
quences" within the meaning of the regulation.17
An important concept which flows from Orrisch is that a capital
account analysis is risk-oriented.18 The court looked to a hypothet-
ical liquidation to see how the risk was spread.19 If the property
were to be sold for a gain, a gain charge back provision would ap-
ply. This provision would allocate to Orrisch the taxable gain on
sale until he equalized his capital account with Crisafi and then
they would split the remaining taxable gain equally.20 Thus, on liq-
uidation, an equal distribution of the proceeds would be in accor-
dance with the capital accounts. This fact was not dispositive to
the court. Instead, the court looked at who was to suffer the eco-
nomic burden if the property was sold at less than the special allo-
cation of depreciation, at a loss, or for neither a gain nor loss, so
that the disparity in capital accounts could not be remedied by the
gain charge back.' 1
Orrisch requires that when there is a gain charge back provision,
it is necessary to determine whether the partner who takes the de-
duction bears any of the economic loss associated with the deduc-
17. Id. at 403-04 (footnotes omitted); but cf. Solomon, supra note 12 at 13-13 (criticizing
the Orrisch decision for concluding that the partners intended to divide the partnership
assets equally, where there was no evidence to support such a conclusion).
18. See Weidner, Partnership Allocations and Capital Accounts Analysis, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 467, 491 (1981).
19. Orrisch, 55 T.C. at 404.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 403.
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tion." A failure to reduce the partners' distribution on liquidation
fails the capital account analysis. The partner who was not given
an allocation bears the economic loss, but upon liquidation he is
compensated by receiving a tax loss. This distinction should not
matter since the tax accounting will always result in him getting
that loss. 8 The regulations require that the allocation have effect
on the actual dollar amount and that the proceeds be allocated in
accordance with the tax results."' Therefore, the divergence of tax
and economic consequences of an allocation for a specific year indi-
cates the lack of substantial economic effect and it is not a defense
to say that there will be a reconciliation on liquidation.2
As a corollary to the above analysis, if a partner has a negative
capital account and any other partner's capital account is positive,
then the allocation lacks substantial economic effect unless that
partner is required to restore the negative balance on liquidation.2
Capital accounts are viewed as reflecting unrecovered investment.
A negative capital account means that the partner has recovered
more than his investment. The negative capital account can no
longer be bearing the economic burden of the allocations.
In contrast, Harris v. Commissioner" is a case in which the Tax
Court found substantial economic effect even though the entire
loss was allocated to one partner. As part of a plan to liquidate
Harris' forty percent partnership interest, the partnership sold a
ten percent interest and specially allocated the loss and cash pro-
ceeds to Harris. Harris then withdrew from the partnership and
received an undivided thirty percent interest in the property,
which he also sold.' The Tax Court found that there was economic
effect because "the loss allocated [to Harris] was applied to reduce
his capital account, and his share of the related items of future
profits, losses, and proceeds in case of liquidation was reduced pro-
portionately."' 0 A decisive factor in the decision was the "exact
equivalence between the amount of the loss and the economic ef-
22. See McKee, Partnership Allocations in Real Estate Ventures: Crane, Kresser and
Orrisch, 30 TAx L. Rzv. 1, 18-20 (1974).
23. Id.
24. See supra text accompanying note 9.
25. See, 1 W. McKaz, W. NELSON & R. Wirrun, ED RAL TAXAF7ON OF PARTNERSHIPS
AND PARTNERS, 1 10.02[2][c] (1977) [hereinafter cited as PARNaIsmHaIs].
26. Id., I 10.02[2][b), at 10-21 to -22. See also McKee, supra note 22, at 22-23.
27. PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 25, 1 10.02[2][b] at 10-22.
28. 61 T.C. 770 (1974).
29. Id. at 776. The property in question was a shopping center.
30. Id. at 786.
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fect as among the partners."'81
The Tax Court again used the capital account analysis in
Magaziner v. Commissioner.2 Magaziner and Feldman formed a
partnership in which most of the depreciation and interest were
allocated to Magaziner in the early years. In later years they were
to be equal partners. On the sale of the property, Magaziner re-
ceived more than fifty percent of the proceeds despite the absence
of a special allocation. The court, citing the Orrisch decision,
looked "to see who is to bear the economic burden of the .... de-
ductions if the partnership property is sold for a sum less than its
original cost and the partnership liquidated.""3 The court strength-
ened the position of capital account analysis by stating that "if the
allocation of an item of income or deduction to a partner is re-
flected in his capital account and the liquidation proceeds of the
entity are distributed in accordance with the capital accounts, the
allocation has substantial economic effect."'" Therefore, Magaziner
is the first case which explicitly stands for the proposition that
substantial economic effect is found by passing the capital account
analysis.8 5
While the capital account analysis is firmly entrenched in part-
nership tax law, it has not gone without criticism. It is claimed
that the capital account analysis can give some allocations substan-
tial economic effect which have tax avoidance as their sole mo-
tive. 6 The most severe criticism of the capital account analysis is
that it fails when nonrecourse debt is involved.87 It is claimed that
nonrecourse debt causes the Orrisch analysis to fail on two counts:
(1) the risk of loss is borne by the nonrecourse lender and not by
the partners," and (2) there will always be a gain on any disposi-
tion of property because the nonrecourse debt is included in the
31. Id.
32. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 873 (1978).
33. Id. at 875 (citing Orrisch, 55 T.C. at 403).
34. Id.
35. See Weidner, supra note 18, at 490.
36. See Solomon, supra note 12, § 13.03[6], at 13-45.
37. See Krane & Sheffield, supra note 12, at 945-49. These authors suggest that when
nonrecourse debt is involved, a percentage ownership analysis should be applied. This anal-
ysis would require calculation of the present value of the partner's economic, nontax interest
in the partnership and of the total benefits the partner can expect. The present value of the
economic benefits is divided by the present value of the total benefits. If the partner's per-
centage ownership of the economic benefits is eighty percent of his percentage ownership of
total benefits, the allocation has substantial economic effect.
38. Id. at 945; see also McKee, supra note 22 at 3-4.
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amount realized.39 No court, however, has found the above criti-
cisms to be of any significance. 0
II. Hamilton v. United States
Since a flip makes use of the allocation provisions, it must pass
muster under the substantial economic effect test. Before Hamil-
ton v. United States,"1 the flip had not been subject to judicial
scrutiny.42 Hamilton gave the United States Court of Claims43 an
opportunity to test the flip provisions of a partnership agreement,
and the court found that the allocations had economic substance. 4
While the tax shelter in Hamilton was an oil and gas limited part-
nership, its flip provisions are similar to those found in most tax
shelter partnerships.45
The flip provision in Hamilton provided basically for the general
partners to contribute a five percent capital interest to the part-
nership with the limited partners contributing the remaining
ninety-five percent. There was an allocation of all income, expenses
and net cash flow distributions to the partners in proportion to
their capital contributions until the limited partners had recovered
their ninety-five percent capital contributions. After recoupment
by the limited partners of their capital contributions, the alloca-
tions were flipped to sixty percent for the limited partners and
forty percent for the general partners." Prior to recoupment, the
39. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). Crane requires that the nonrecourse
debt be included in the amount realized upon sale. See also, Krane & Sheffield, supra note
12,.at 946 n.34.
40. But see 48 Fed. Reg. 9871-9886 (1983) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1) (proposed
March 4, 1983). The service has proposed new regulations in which it attempts to address
these criticisms as well as other problems. See infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text.
41. 687 F.2d 408 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
42. See, e.g., 1 Wiuna, supra note 2, § 46.03, at 46-6.
43. The Court of Claims was merged with the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in
October of 1982 to form the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
44. Economic substance is the test for pre-1976 bottom-line allocations, but the court
found that the test differs only slightly from the substantial economic effect test. Hamilton,
687 F.2d at 414. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
45. See Willis, Special Allocations of Partnership Profits and Losses, 7 J. REAL EST.
TAX'N 356 (1980). Willis discusses the importance of Tech. Advice Memo. 7707260880A
(July 26, 1977) to real estate partnerships. The memorandum concerned the same flip provi-
sion at issue in Hamilton. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
46. Hamilton, 687 F.2d at 411. None of the limited partnerships followed these percent-
ages exactly; there were some differences. This statement of facts reflects the basic mechan-
ics of the flip provisions. Tech. Advice Memo. 7707260880A, which the Service issued on the
Hamilton partnerships, used the same general percentage figures. Id.
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general partners could have accelerated the flip by paying the lim-
ited partners a specified portion of their unrecovered capital con-
tributions. A liquidation before the capital contribution recovery
entitled the general partners to a forty percent interest in the part-
nership assets, less the limited partners' "[n]et [p]rofits interest."4
The net profits interest was to come solely out of the partnership
assets.
The Hamiltons' first limited partnership was formed in 1956 and
was the subject of a favorable 1957 private letter ruling."8 A 1967
limited partnership was also the subject of a favorable private let-
ter ruling. In 1969 the Hamiltons and other partners exchanged
their partnership interests for shares in Hamilton Brothers Petro-
leum Corporation. The transaction for income tax purposes was re-
ported under section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code with a total
exchange value of approximately sixty-five million dollars. In 1977
the Service issued a memorandum ° which found that the alloca-
tion (flip) provisions of the limited partnerships were inconsistent
with the economic substance of the arrangements. The Hamiltons
then sued for income tax refunds for 1969 claiming that the Ser-
vice improperly interpreted the partnership agreements.
A. Loan Theory
In contesting the allocation provisions of the partnership, the
Service argued a nonrecourse loan theory. The Service contended
that, although the general partners had stated their interest in the
partnership at five percent, their interest was actually closer to
forty percent. Pleading in the alternative, the Service claimed that
the additional thirty-five percent interest came either from a non-
recourse loan by the limited partners to the general partners or
that the limited partners transferred thirty-five percent of their in-
terests to the general partners in return for an equal amount of
nonrecourse debt.81 The Service pointed to the net profits interest
as not 'an interest in the assets of the partnership' which is prop-
erly allocable to the limited partners"' 2 and that reallocation of the
47. The net profits interest is calculated by taking approximately thirty-five percent of
the limited partners' capital contributions less any cash distributions they have received. Id.
at 421.
48. Id. at 410.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 411 (citing Tech. Advice Memo. 7707260880A (July 26, 1977)).
51. Id. at 412.
52. Id. at 415.
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partnership income would result in additional income to the plain-
tiffs. In addition, the Service contended that when the partner-
ships were incorporated the "loans were discharged and plaintiffs
recognized a taxable gain to the extent that the outstanding loans
exceeded plaintiffs' bases in the partnership interests
transferred.""3
As support for rejecting the Service's nonrecourse loan theory,
the court looked to example five of Treasury Regulation section
1.704-1(b)(2) and Revenue Ruling 68-139." Both were found to
have a set of facts directly analogous to the present case and both
upheld the validity of a shift in the allocation provisions.8 5 Fur-
53. Id. at 409.
54. Id. at 415-16 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (ex. 5) (1964); Rev. Rul. 139, 1968-1
C.B. 311.
55. Id. at 415-16. Example 5 of Tress. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964) provides the following
hypothetical:
G and H, each of whom is engaged as a sole proprietor in the business of devel-
oping and marketing electronic devices, enter into a partnership agreement to de-
velop and market electronic devices. H contributes $2,500 cash and agrees to
devote his full-time services to the partnership. G contributes $100,000 cash and
agrees to obtain a loan for the partnership of any additional capital needed. The
partnership agreement provides that the full amount of any research and experi-
mental expenditures and any interest on partnership loans are to be charged to G.
It also provides that G's distributive share is to be 90 percent of partnership in-
come or loss computed without reduction by such research and experimental ex-
penditures and such interest, until all loans have been repaid and G has received
through his 90 percent share of income an amount equal to the full amount of
such research and experimental expenditures, of such interest, and his share of
any partnership operating losses. During this time H's distributive share will be 10
percent. Thereafter, G and H will share profits and losses equally. Since all of the
research and experimental expenditures and interest specifically allocated to G are
in fact borne by G, the allocation will be recognized in the absence of other cir-
cumstances showing that its principal purpose was tax avoidance or evasion.
Rev. Rul. 139 states:
The parties, A, B, and C, entered into a partnership agreement for the joint explo-
ration of oil and gas in which B and C were required to contribute 300x dollars,
each, to be used for drilling and equipping the first test well for which B and C
each received a 3/32d working interest in the leases for their contributions. A re-
tained the remaining 26/32d working interest. The contributions were to be paid,
one-half by B and one-half by C, as follows: (a) 300x dollars upon the first test
well reaching 3,500 feet and (b) 300x dollars upon the first test well reaching 7,500
feet or 1,000 feet above the top of a specified formation, or to a depth which en-
countered commercial production.
Partner A commenced drilling the test well and soon thereafter B and C each
contributed their 300x dollars, all of which was expended in drilling the well and
was sufficient to complete it.
The partnership agreement provided that all items of cost were to be allocated
to the partners in accordance with their portion of the contributions to the respec-
tive items of cost. In determining contributions to intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs, the initial payments of B and C made pursuant to the partnership
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ther, the court found that it could not reconcile the Service's loan
theory with the absence of any mention of such a theory in these
authorities."
Next, the court looked to Revenue Ruling 72-13557 and found
that it was "most damaging to [the Service's] position. "5 8 The rul-
ing dealt with limited partners receiving a nonrecourse loan from
general partners in order to enable the limited partners to invest in
the partnership. The ruling determined that the loan is a contribu-
tion of capital by the general partners which adds to their bases.
From this, the court extrapolated "that when a partner makes a
nonrecourse loan to another partner . . . the 'lender's'-not the
'borrower's'-basis in his partnership interest is increased.""'
Therefore, the ruling supported the premise that, even if the lim-
ited partners in Hamilton did make a nonrecourse loan, a realloca-
tion is not mandated because the loan is considered a contribution
of capital by the limited partners.
Finally, the court found that the Service's loan theory "charac-
terize[s] the provisions of [the] agreement in a manner which is
agreement, would, to the extent so expended, represent their respective contribu-
tions to the intangible drilling and development costs incurred by the
partnership....
Accordingly, the provisions of the partnership agreement to allocate the intangible
drilling and development costs incurred by the partnership will be recognized, if a
proper election is made by the partnership under sections 1.703-1(b)(1) and 1.612-
4 of the regulations to deduct intangible drilling and development costs, unless
examination discloses that the principal purpose of the allocation is the avoidance
or evasion of Federal income tax.
Rev. Rul. 139, 1968-1 C.B. 311 (citations omitted).
56. Hamilton, 687 F.2d at 416-17.
57. Rev. Rul. 135, 1972-1 C.B. 200 provides the following:
ABC, Ltd., is a limited partnership engaged in the acquisition, exploration, de-
velopment and operation of oil and natural gas properties in which P is the gen-
eral partner. The limited partners are those investors who have subscribed to a
public offering of limited partnership interests in ABC. The limited partnership
agreement provides that P may loan, on a nonrecourse basis, to limited partners, a
portion of their subscription in ABC. The agreement further provides that P may
make loans, on a nonrecourse basis, to the partnership.
Held, in the instant case, a nonrecourse "loan" from the general partner to a
limited partner or to the partnership is a contribution to the capital of the part-
nership by the general partner, rather than a loan, and accordingly, the amount
thereof shall be added to the basis of the partnership interest of the general part-
ner and not to the basis of the partnership interest of the limited partner.
58. Hamilton, 687 F.2d at 417.
59. Id.
60. However, the Service's alternate argument that the limited partners transferred
thirty-five percent of their interests to the general partners in return for an equal amount of
nonrecourse debt is supported by the ruling.
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contrary to [its] economic reality."'6 Prior tax opinions did not de-
termine the validity of allocations by characterizing the allocation
as a loan; rather, they looked to whether the partner who received
the allocation bore the economic burden of the allocation.62 The
court found that by recharacterizing the limited partners' contri-
butions as a nonrecourse debt or a transfer of a portion of their
interest in return for a net profits interest, the Service "[did] not
alter the fact that the limited partners' contributions to the part-
nerships equaled their total economic burden." '5
B. Substantial Economic Effect v. Economic Substance
Even though Hamilton recognized that the validity of allocations
is ascertained by the economic burden of the allocations, it did not
feel that the substantial economic effect test was applicable." This
is because the challenged allocations are bottom-line allocations"
and prior to 1976 there was a distinction made between the test of
special and bottom-line allocations. Special allocations, which are
allocations of a specific item of income, loss, deduction or credit to
a partner, are subject to the substantial economic effect test." Bot-
tom-line allocations, which are allocations of net income or loss
generated by activities of the partnership, are not tested by the
substantial economic effect test but by the economic substance test
of Kresser v. Commissioner,67 and Boynton v. Commissioner." The
Kresser-Boynton standard is whether the substance of the agree-
ment reflects the partners' allocations of benefits and burden.69
However, the Hamilton court found that for bottom-line alloca-
tions the test "differs only slightly from the standard found in [In-
ternal Revenue Code] section 704(b)(2) and the use of one rather
than the other should have little effect on the outcome of this
61. Hamilton, 687 F.2d at 417.
62. See, e.g., Holladay v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 571, 587 (1979), affd, 649 F.2d 1176
(5th Cir. 1981); Boynton v. Commissioner 72 T.C. 1147, 1159 (1979), affd. 649 F.2d 1168
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146, (1982); Magaziner v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M.
(CCH) 873, 875 (1978).
63. Hamilton, 687 F.2d at 418.
64. Id. at 414, 418 (applying the pre-1976 economic substance test).
65. Id. at 414.
66. Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 187, 1966-2 C.B. 246; but see 2 Wniis, supra note 2, § 82.01,
at 82-2 (claiming there is no specific meaning of special allocation).
67. 54 T.C. 1621 (1970).
68. 72 T.C. 1147 (1979).
69. Hamilton, 687 F.2d at 414.
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case."
70
In determining the economic substance of the allocations the
court applied an analysis similar to that of a capital account test.
First, the court found that the net cash flow was allocated accord-
ing to the economic substance of the partners' deal. 1 Important to
the court was the fact that prior to the flip the allocation scheme
operated to reimburse all the partners at the same time for their
capital contributions and according to their initial capital contri-
butions; i.e. for every $100 of cash receipts, $95 would be alloted to
the limited partners and $5 to the general partners.7 2 Another fac-
tor of importance was that the flip of the distributions and taxable
income occurred at the same time and to the same extent for all
the partners. 8
Second, the court looked at the liquidation provisions of the
partnership agreement. The court concentrated on the effect of a
liquidation which might occur prior to the flip. 74 In such a liquida-
tion, the limited partners would receive sixty percent of their capi-
tal contributions plus a net profits interest. The net profits interest
would give the limited partners the remaining thirty-five percent
of their capital contributions less any cash distributions they had
received. 7' The court found that the 'net profits interest' is an
economic interest . . . similar to a royalty. ' '71 Therefore, through-
out the entire term of the partnership, a liquidation would result
in the partners recovering their capital contributions in proportion
to the economic burden they bore.
Hamilton rightfully rejected the Service's loan theory and in-
stead focused on the economic substance of the partnership agree-
ment. It is unfortunate that the court was not able to apply the
substantial economic effect test to the allocations at issue, but it
was saddled with the archaic distinction made between special and
bottom-line allocations. However, the court seemed to indicate
70. Id. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) contains the substantial economic effect test. See supra note 1.
71. Hamilton, 687 F.2d at 418.
72. Id.
73. Id. Distributions are not taxable to the partners unless the distribution exceeds the
basis of the partner's partnership interest. See Caruthers, Real Estate Tax Shelters: Special
and Retroactive Allocations Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 4 J. REAL EST. TAx 119,
139 (1977) (explaining how the flip may cause taxable gain to the partners because the flip
relieves them of a proportionate share of liabilities); see also Seago & Horvitz, Some Subtle
Effects of the Partnership Constructive Distribution Rules, 58 TAxEs 97, 99-100 (1980).
74. Hamilton, 687 F.2d at 418, 419.
75. Id. at 421 (approximate figures); see supra note 46.
76. Hamilton, 687 F.2d at 419 (citing Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S.
599, 604 (1946)).
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that the distinction was without merit. 7 While the court claimed
to use the economic substance test of Kresser and Boynton, the
characteristics it examined in determining the validity of the allo-
cations were the same as those that would have been examined if a
capital account analysis under the substantial economic effect test
had been used. In matter of fact, the court recognized in a footnote
that the allocations at issue would have survived the scrutiny of
the substantial economic effect-capital account test78 Thus the
court has relieved much of the uncertainty as to whether a flip is a
valid method of allocation by finding the flip at issue to have eco-
nomic substance.7 9
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
While case law and practitioners have repeatedly used a capital
account analysis to determine the substantial economic effect of
allocations, Treasury Regulation section 1.704-1(b)(2) does not in-
clude any reference to capital accounts. 0 In order to remedy this
omission and to update the regulation, the Service has proposed a
new regulation.81 The proposed regulation spells out at length the
rules and applications of the capital account analysis. The follow-
ing is a brief outline of the concepts in the new regulation."2
The proposed substantial economic effect-capital account test is
a two pronged test. The first prong requires that the allocation
have economic effect. This is based on a risk concept which re-
quires that where "there is an economic benefit or economic bur-
den which corresponds to the allocation, the allocation will actually
affect (to the same extent) the dollar amount received by such
partner."881 In order to meet the requirement of economic effect the
following factors must be present:
(a) The allocation is reflected as an appropriate increase or de-
crease in that partner's capital account ... and
77. Id. at 414.
78. Id. at 419 n.29.
79. The Service has proposed a new Tress. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2), and has included several
examples where the validity of a flip is upheld under the capital accounts test. See 48 Fed.
Reg. 9,871, supra note 40. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
80. The regulation was first promulgated in 1960 (amended 1964), long before capital
account analysis was considered the main test to determine substantial economic effect.
81. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,871, supra note 40.
82. The proposed regulation would expand the present one line reference to substantial
economic effect to fifteen pages in the Federal Register. Id. at 9,872-86.
83. Id. at 9,873.
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(b) Liquidation proceeds are, throughout the term of the part-
nership, to be distributed in accordance with the partners' capital
account balances, and
(c) Any partner with a deficit in his capital account following
the distribution of liquidation proceeds is required to restore the
amount of such deficit to the partnership, which amount shall be
distributed to partners in accordance with their positive capital
account balances [or] paid to creditors.'
The second prong of the test requires substantiality, which is de-
termined by weighing "the likelihood and magnitude of ...
shift[s] in the economic consequences among partners. . against
the shifting of tax consequences resulting from the allocation (or
allocations), particularly tax consequences which result from the
interaction of the allocation (or allocations) with the partners."8 5
There is a rebuttable presumption of lack of substantiality if the
shift in tax consequences is disproportionately larger than the
changes in economic consequences. Further, substantiality is deter-
mined by assuming that the economic benefit or burden will occur
without regard to the probability of such occurrence. Therefore, it
is not necessary that the allocation of accelerated cost recovery be
matched by an equal decline in the value of the property."
Failing both prongs of the substantial economic effect-capital ac-
counts test requires that the allocations be reallocated in accor-
dance with the partners' interest in the partnership. The proposed
regulation spells out what is considered to be an interest in the
partnership. It starts off with the presumption that the partners all
have an equal interest. However, this presumption may be rebut-
ted by proving facts and circumstances otherwise. The proposed
regulation finds the following facts relevant:
(1) The partners' relative contributions to the partnership;
(2) The interests of the partners in economic profits and losses
(if different from that in taxable income or loss);
(3) The interests of the partners in cash flow and other distri-
butions; and
(4) The rights of the partners to distributions of capital and
other property upon liquidation."1
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 9,874.
87. Id. at 9,875.
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In addition, the proposed regulation would apply restrictive
rules for all partnerships where the allocations are based on
nonrecourse financing.8 The regulation is structured to police
against any allocations in which the creditor bears the economic
burden. In order to determine when the creditor bears the burden,
a "minimum gain" must be calculated by taking the difference be-
tween the unpaid principal and the adjusted basis of the prop-
erty.89 The sum of all capital accounts of those partners with nega-
tive balances cannot exceed the minimum gain unless those
partners with deficits are allocated subsequent income and gain
sufficient to "pay back" the deficits.9
The proposed regulation provides several examples where the
capital account analysis is applied to a flip provision. Example 391
of the proposed regulation is the same as Example 5 of the present
regulation except that it requires the allocation to conform with
the capital account requirements given above. Along with Example
3, Example 29" and Example 169" deal with flip provisions. All of
these examples show that flips can be valid if they follow the re-
quirements of the proposed regulations.
The impact of the proposed regulation appears to be favorable
to flips. The examples indicate when the flip is a valid allocation
and gives the practitioner some guidance. All of the relevant exam-
ples permit a flip which is designed to give certain partners a swift
recovery of their initial investment. This is an important market-
ing tool for partnerships." Without the ability to offer certain
partners a guaranteed return on their investment, partnerships
would be severely impaired in their ability to generate capital.
In general, the passage of the proposed regulation will help clar-
ify a confused area which long has been in need of reform. 5 The
capital account analysis will be recognized as the test for substan-
tial economic effect, and several features of this analysis are simply
a restatement of prior law. The requirement that the allocation be
reflected in the partner's capital account and that the liquidation
proceeds be distributed in accordance with the capital account has
88. Id. at 9,876.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 9,878-79.
92. Id. at 9,878.
93. Id. at 9,882.
94. See 1 WILLs, supra note 2, § 46.01, at 46-1 to -2.
95. See Weidner, supra note 12, at 64.
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always been considered the heart of a capital account test." Also,
the requirement of substantiality has been an integral part of the
substantial economic effect test from the outset.7 To the extent
the proposed regulation will restate prior law,'8 it will eliminate
ambiguities which currently exist.
However, the proposed regulation has some aspects which will
only muddy the waters. Most notable is the restriction on alloca-
tions which are based on nonrecourse financing. Unlike the eco-
nomic effect and substantiality tests, the rules for nonrecourse
financing are supported by very little authority."O No judicial or
legislative 00 authorities have ever -pplied such restrictions on allo-
cations which are possible because of nonrecourse financing. The
Service is attempting to do administratively that which both Con-
gress and the judiciary have failed to do.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fact that flip provisions can have substantial economic effect
is finally recognized. Hamilton, as the first case to determine the
substantial economic effect 01 of a flip, demonstrates as much.
Practitioners now have a model of a flip allocation which can pass
judicial scrutiny. In addition, the proposed regulation would only
reinforce the fact that flips can have substantial economic effect
and provide further examples of safe harbors.
96. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
98. There is some uncertainty as to whether the liability nature of a negative capital
account is a restatement of prior law. The Uniform Partnership Act §§ 18, 40, 6 U.L.A. 213,
469 (1969), seems to indicate that a negative capital account measures the potential liability
of the partner to the partnership if the partnership is immediately liquidated. But see 2
Wnaus, supra note 2, § 86.05, at 86-9; PAST~unsns, supra note 25, 110.0212], at 10-23.
However, at present only one court has interpeted these provisions to impose liability on the
partner for a negative capital account. See Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 668, 672
(Tex. 1976).
99. McKee seems to be the only authority for these rules on nonrecourse financing. See
PARTNERSHmS, supra note 25, 10.0312], at 10-27 to -34.
100. It may be claimed that the I.R.C. § 465 "at risk" rules lend some credence to a
finding of a legislative mandate to deal harshly with nonrecourse financing. The applicabil-
ity of this argument is extremely limited. The "at risk" rules deal only with the initial inclu-
sion of nonrecourse debts in the partners' basis and not the deductibility once included.
101. Actually, Hamilton determined that the flip passed the economic substance test.
See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text. However, the court recognized that the sub-
stantial economic effect test is similar to the economic substance test and that the alloca-
tions at issue would pass the substantial economic effect test. See supra notes 70-79 and
accompanying text.
